Is a Concussion a Serious Injury Under PA Limited Tort?

A concussion is not automatically a "serious injury" under Pennsylvania's limited tort law, and it is not automatically excluded. Under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d) and § 1702, a person bound by limited tort may recover pain and suffering only for a personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement, unless an exception applies. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's test in Washington v. Baxter asks which body function was impaired and whether that impairment was serious, and the question goes to a jury unless reasonable minds could not differ. In the concussion decisions below, the result turned on documented effects on function and medical proof tying them to the crash.

What the Statute Actually Says

Two sections of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law control this question. Section 1705(d) says a person who elects limited tort "remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss," but "[u]nless the injury sustained is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort election shall be precluded from maintaining an action for any noneconomic loss," subject to listed exceptions.

Section 1702 supplies the definitions. "Serious injury" is "[a] personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement." "Noneconomic loss" is "[p]ain and suffering and other nonmonetary detriment."

Neither section mentions concussions, brain injuries, or any other diagnosis. There is no list of qualifying injuries. For a concussion, the only realistic path through the definition is usually "serious impairment of body function," and the phrase is not defined in the statute. The Supreme Court said so in Washington: the act "does not provide any assistance to us in defining" it. If you need the broader background first, start with our guides to how Pennsylvania limited tort works after a crash and the side-by-side comparison of limited tort and full tort. This page deals with the narrower question of how a concussion fits that definition.

The Washington v. Baxter Test

Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1998), remains the governing framework. The court adopted a definition from Michigan's DiFranco v. Pickard decision that poses two questions:

• "What body function, if any, was impaired because of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident?"
• "Was the impairment of the body function serious?"

The adopted language then adds four points that matter in every concussion case:

• Function, not diagnosis. "The focus of these inquiries is not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a particular body function."
• Medical proof. "Generally, medical testimony will be needed to establish the existence, extent, and permanency of the impairment."
• The seriousness factors. "[T]he extent of the impairment, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors."
• Permanence is not required. "An impairment need not be permanent to be serious."

That last sentence is especially useful in a concussion claim, because a person whose symptoms eventually improve has not lost the argument for that reason alone. The other side of Washington is just as important. The plaintiff there had a foot injury, and the court held that his impairment was "clearly de minimis." It wrote that "it is insufficient for Appellant to show that there has been some injury—no matter how minor—in order to avoid the entry of summary judgment against him."

Put those two points together and you have the real answer to the question on this page. A concussion diagnosis proves that there was an injury. By itself, it does not prove that a body function was seriously impaired.

Who Decides: The Jury Question

Before Washington, Pennsylvania courts had treated the threshold as an initial question for the trial judge. Washington changed that. The court reviewed the legislative history, found that the General Assembly had rejected amendments that would have made seriousness a question of law, and held that the determination "was not to be made routinely by a trial court judge" but left "to a jury unless reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of whether a serious injury had been sustained." The court summed it up this way: "the ultimate determination should be made by the jury in all but the clearest of cases."

In practice, a limited tort concussion claim can face two separate gates:

• Summary judgment. After discovery, the defense may ask the judge to dismiss the pain and suffering claim. The evidence is read in the injured person's favor, and the motion should be denied if reasonable minds could differ.
• The fact-finder. If the claim survives, a jury (or a judge sitting without a jury) decides whether the injury was serious. Surviving summary judgment does not mean the threshold has been met.

"All but the clearest of cases" is favorable language, but it does not stop courts from granting these motions. Washington itself, McGee, and Ramirez were all decided against the injured person at summary judgment.

How Courts Have Treated Concussions and Similar Claims

In researching this page, I did not find a precedential Pennsylvania appellate opinion deciding whether a concussion meets the threshold. The closest appellate decision I found is a non-precedential memorandum, and it went against the plaintiff. The table below separates what each decision is and what drove it.

Decision	Claimed injury	Result	What mattered
Washington v. Baxter (Pa. 1998)	Foot injury, strains, cuts and contusions	Summary judgment affirmed	Mild diagnosis, little treatment, few missed shifts, little effect on work or personal activities
McGee v. Muldowney, 750 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 2000)	Back and shoulder	Summary judgment affirmed	Years with little care, full-time work in a trade, no objective medical evidence of the degree of impairment
Ramirez v. Burger, No. 1120 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-precedential)	Concussion, post-concussion syndrome, possible brain bleed	Summary judgment affirmed	No treatment for six years, no report tying current complaints to the crash, inconclusive CT finding
Chebbani v. United States, No. 5:21-cv-04298 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (federal trial court)	Concussion, post-concussion syndrome	Not serious after trial	Concussion proven, but court found no substantial interference with a bodily function
Cadena v. Latch, 78 A.3d 636 (Pa. Super. 2013)	Neck and back injuries, with headaches	Summary judgment reversed	Physician causation opinion, detailed effect on daily life, treatment gap explained
Graham v. Campo, 990 A.2d 9 (Pa. Super. 2010)	Nerve root injury, strains and sprains	Noneconomic award upheld	Physician testimony on the injury and continuing limits in daily activities

Ramirez v. Burger: The Closest Appellate Case

Ramirez deserves a careful read by anyone with a concussion and a limited tort policy. It is an unpublished memorandum, so it does not bind other panels, but under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) a Superior Court memorandum filed after May 1, 2019 "may be cited for [its] persuasive value."

The plaintiff was a minor passenger in her mother's car on an icy road in Monroe County. She went to the hospital more than two weeks later, was diagnosed with post-concussion syndrome, and had one follow-up visit. She then had no medical treatment for six years. She testified to continuing headaches and absentmindedness and said she had given up karate and guitar. She had also graduated from high school and college, and was working.

The court's reasoning is a checklist of what was missing. The CT report said the finding "may represent a hemorrhagic contusion or gyral hemorrhage alternatively this may be artifactual." There was no MRI report in the record and no report establishing a brain bleed from the crash. The plaintiff "has not presented expert reports or medical records, or any form of objective medical evidence establishing that the injuries she sustained in the January 3, 2014 car accident caused her ongoing complaints." She also "has not presented medical evidence concluding that her post-concussion syndrome was a serious impairment." The court agreed that "reasonable minds could not differ as to whether Appellant sustained a serious injury."

Notice what Ramirez did not hold. It did not say a concussion can never qualify. It decided a record with almost no medical evidence after the first weeks.

Chebbani: A Proven Concussion That Still Was Not "Serious"

In Chebbani, a federal judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied Pennsylvania law as fact-finder in a claim against the United States arising from a crash in King of Prussia. The plaintiff proved causation: the court found she "suffered a concussion and post-concussion syndrome" from the accident. A physician retained for the litigation testified to a "serious impairment of her brain function." The court still wrote that she "cannot show that her concussion and post-concussion syndrome caused 'substantial interference with any bodily function.'"

The court pointed to normal neurologic findings in the ER, her eventual return to full-time work, headaches about once or twice a month, no noticeable limitations at trial, and no evidence of difficulty caring for herself or her family. A trial court opinion does not bind Pennsylvania state courts, and this one was decided on a full trial record rather than at summary judgment. It is still a clear example of the gap between proving a concussion and proving a serious impairment.

Decisions Outside the Concussion Context

The favorable decisions I can point to did not involve concussions, so they show the method rather than a concussion rule. In Cadena, the Superior Court held that the trial court "abused its discretion when it granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment." The plaintiff had a physician's opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that her symptoms were a direct result of the accident and had a negative effect on her daily activities. She also explained how her life had changed. When the trial court relied on the end of her treatment, the panel answered that "she did not have health insurance to continue to pay for the treatment."

In Graham, the court upheld noneconomic damages for a limited tort plaintiff based on medical testimony and her ongoing limits, repeating that "the focus of this analysis is not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a particular body function." The court's summary of Robinson v. Upole in that passage describes a reversal where the injury "prevented her from doing physical activity such as housework without pain."

Vetter v. Miller, 157 A.3d 943 (Pa. Super. 2017), was not a win, but it is useful. Citing Long v. Mejia, it says evidence of "how that injury negatively impacted the person's ability to perform his or her chosen profession" is relevant. The limited tort claimant there still lost at summary judgment, because she kept working full-time, cared for her child, and pursued a nursing degree despite sleep deprivation and PTSD symptoms. For someone whose job depends on concentration, memory, or screen work, both points matter.

How Post-Concussive Symptoms Are Documented

Here is the practical problem. The National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke describes a concussion as "a type of mild TBI" and says available imaging and other measures "can't always detect damage from mild, concussive injuries." McGee, meanwhile, says "subjective allegations . . . in the absence of objective medical evidence, do not permit a finding" of serious injury. McGee was a back and shoulder case and did not define "objective medical evidence." Ramirez listed expert reports and medical records as forms of proof, not just scans. Neither opinion says a positive scan is required, and an attorney can confirm how this applies to your record. What they do show is that your own description, without medical support, is unlikely to carry the claim.

These are the medical definitions and the evidence categories. They are not medical advice. Please follow your own doctors, and never seek or skip care because of a lawsuit.

• Timing of the first record. The CDC says some symptoms "may not appear for hours or days after the injury." A delay is explainable, but the sooner a symptom reaches a chart, the shorter that argument is.
• Symptoms in the CDC's categories. The CDC groups them as physical, thinking and remembering, social or emotional, and sleep. Tell your providers about all of them, including "[a]ttention or concentration problems," "[f]eeling slowed down," and "[t]rouble falling asleep."
• Function, in concrete terms. Charts that say "headache" tell less than charts that record what you could not do, for how long, and what your doctor restricted.
• Continuity. The CDC says "most people with a mild TBI or concussion feel better within a couple of weeks," and NINDS says "[p]ost-concussion syndrome involves symptoms that last for weeks or longer." If your symptoms continue, the defense will look for the records showing it. A gap with a real reason should be explained, as in Cadena.
• Neuropsychological testing, when your doctor orders it. NINDS says such tests "are often used along with imaging in people who have suffered mild TBI."
• A causation opinion. Ramirez turned partly on the lack of medical evidence tying current complaints to the crash, and on other stressors in the plaintiff's life. Prior concussions, migraines, and similar history need to be addressed directly.
• Outside records. Employer records, school records, accommodations, and people who saw the change can speak to work, study, and daily activities. See our guide to proving a car accident brain injury for how the medical pieces fit together.

The first Washington question calls for identifying the function specifically, such as concentration, memory, balance, or vision, based on what the medical records support. Identifying the function is the easier part. Chebbani shows the second question, seriousness, is where a claim can fail even with a doctor's opinion on your side.

Limited Tort Exceptions That Can Make the Threshold Irrelevant

Check these before you assume the serious injury fight is even necessary. Under § 1705, a person otherwise bound by limited tort keeps full tort rights in these situations:

• The person at fault "is convicted or accepts Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in that accident." § 1705(d)(1)(i).
• The person at fault "is operating a motor vehicle registered in another state." § 1705(d)(1)(ii).
• The person at fault intended to injure, as narrowly defined. § 1705(d)(1)(iii).
• The person at fault "has not maintained financial responsibility as required by this chapter." § 1705(d)(1)(iv).
• The claim is against a business that designs, makes, repairs, or services motor vehicles, for a defect. § 1705(d)(2).
• You were "an occupant of a motor vehicle other than a private passenger motor vehicle." § 1705(d)(3). Section 1702 defines that term as a "four-wheel motor vehicle" insured by a natural person, with other limits, so a motorcycle or a vehicle insured by a business may fall outside it. See our guides on limited tort for motorcycle riders and limited tort in truck crashes.

Other rules can matter too. Under § 1705(b)(3), a person who does not own a currently registered private passenger vehicle and is not a named insured or insured under any private passenger policy is not precluded. In L.S. v. David Eschbach, Jr., Inc., 874 A.2d 1150 (Pa. 2005), the Supreme Court held that "as an innocent pedestrian, L.S.'s right of recovery should not be restricted by her mother's election of the limited tort alternative." That reasoning did not help in Ramirez, where the minor was a passenger in her mother's car. Our page on limited tort for pedestrians and cyclists covers this further. And § 1705 speaks to a "motor vehicle accident," so it does not reach a concussion from something like a fall on a defective stairway.

What Compensation May Be Available

Limited tort does not end a claim. As we explain in whether limited tort bars a claim entirely, the statute keeps economic loss available regardless of the threshold.

• Economic loss. The statutory notice describes limited tort insureds as able to "seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses." In Chebbani, for example, the economic recovery that remained after the limited tort ruling included medical costs and lost wages. Note that under § 1722, a person eligible for first-party benefits "shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits paid or payable."
• Noneconomic loss. If the threshold is met or an exception applies, you may seek pain and suffering and other nonmonetary detriment.
• Your own UM/UIM coverage. The limit follows you there. Under § 1731(d)(2), a person precluded under § 1705 "may not recover from uninsured motorist coverage or underinsured motorist coverage for noneconomic damages."

No one can tell you in advance what a claim is worth or whether it will cross the threshold. Fault also matters, and our comparative negligence and limited tort FAQ covers how shared fault is handled.

Mistakes to Avoid

• Assuming you have limited tort. Get your declarations page and the signed election form. The statutory notice says that if you do not sign and return it, "you will be considered to have chosen the 'full tort' coverage." Also check whether a household member's policy binds you under § 1705(b).
• Assuming limited tort ends the claim because someone told you so. Economic loss, the threshold, and the exceptions all remain.
• Treating the diagnosis as the finish line. Washington focuses on function, not the label.
• Telling an insurer "I'm fine" while you are still working out what is wrong. Be accurate, and do not guess about how you are doing.
• Letting records end while symptoms continue. Ramirez is the example. If care stops for a reason such as cost, make sure the reason is known.
• Leaving out earlier head injuries or headaches. The defense can obtain that history. It is better addressed early and honestly.

Why Acting Now Matters

Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2), an action "to recover damages for injuries to the person" generally must be commenced within two years. If a government unit may be responsible, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(a) requires written notice "[w]ithin six months from the date that any injury was sustained or any cause of action accrued," subject to the exceptions in that section. Our statute of limitations FAQ covers more on deadlines. Beyond deadlines, the evidence in a concussion claim is mostly about what was recorded during the months when symptoms were active. That window closes whether or not a lawyer is involved.

What Happens Next

1. The first step is confirming your tort election and checking each exception, including the at-fault driver's plate, insurance, and any DUI outcome.
2. The crash report, medical records, and work or school records should be gathered, and anything missing identified, while you continue your care.
3. The claim can be presented to the at-fault driver's insurer once your condition is understood well enough.
4. If the claim does not resolve, suit must be filed before the deadline. Discovery follows, and the defense may seek summary judgment on the threshold.
5. If the question survives, it goes to a jury or is resolved by agreement.

Why Work With Quinlan Law Group

I have been a Pennsylvania attorney since 2001, with offices in Camp Hill and Harrisburg. A limited tort concussion claim depends on reading the records against the Washington factors early, while there is still time to fill gaps honestly. The consultation is free and confidential. It covers your tort election and whether an exception applies, and it covers what deadlines apply. Learn more on our Pennsylvania traumatic brain injury page.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does a concussion automatically count as a serious injury in Pennsylvania?

No. Neither 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702 nor § 1705 lists concussions. Under Washington v. Baxter, the question is which body function was impaired and whether that impairment was serious, based on its extent, duration, required treatment, and other relevant factors.

Does post-concussion syndrome have to be permanent to qualify?

No. Washington states that "[a]n impairment need not be permanent to be serious." However, in Ramirez v. Burger, a non-precedential Superior Court memorandum, a post-concussion syndrome diagnosis without later medical support did not get past summary judgment.

Can I meet the threshold if my CT scan was normal?

Possibly. NINDS says imaging "can't always detect damage from mild, concussive injuries," and I found no Pennsylvania opinion requiring a positive scan. But McGee v. Muldowney requires more than subjective allegations, so medical records and testimony on the impairment are important. An attorney can confirm how this applies to your record.

Who decides whether my concussion was serious?

Generally a jury. Washington says the determination belongs to the jury "in all but the clearest of cases," but a judge can decide it at summary judgment if reasonable minds could not differ.

Does my parent's limited tort election apply to my child's concussion?

It can. Section 1705(b)(2) applies the election to insureds under the policy who are not named insureds on another policy, and Ramirez held a mother's election bound her minor daughter riding in her car. L.S. v. David Eschbach, Jr., Inc. reached a different result for a child pedestrian.

If I do not meet the threshold, do I get nothing?

No. Section 1705(d) keeps you eligible to seek economic loss from the at-fault party, which is separate from pain and suffering. Section 1722 bars recovering amounts paid or payable as first-party benefits.

Talk to a Pennsylvania Injury Lawyer About Your Case

If you were hurt in a crash and were told limited tort rules out your concussion claim, have your policy and records reviewed before you accept that answer. Call (717) 724-7503 or request a free case review. You pay no attorney fee unless there is a recovery. You may be responsible for certain case costs and expenses in addition to the fee, as explained in your written fee agreement. Our Camp Hill office at 3425 Simpson Ferry Rd, Suite 100, Camp Hill, PA 17011 serves clients statewide.

This article is general information about Pennsylvania law, not legal advice for your specific situation, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Attorney advertising. Sean Quinlan, Esq., Quinlan Law Group, Camp Hill, PA.